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EVERYTHING I NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
PRESIDENTS I LEARNED FROM DR. SEUSS
GARY LAWSON*
Oaths are out of fashion these days. This is an era in which it
is widely considered unreasonable to expect the President of
the United States to obey basic principles of law and justice,
much less to honor something as abstract as an oath. Perjury-
the violation of a legally binding oath-is publicly defended as
proof of the offender's humanity rather than his criminality.
And one should not even mention in polite company
something as gauche as honoring an oath of marriage. Those
pesky vows of marital fidelity were, after all, just words.
The next President of the United States will have to speak
some words before he can assume the office of the presidency.
Indeed, the precise words to be spoken are inscribed in the text
of the Constitution (as they are not for any other office)': "I do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the
Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of
my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States."2 Of course, the oath clauses of the
Constitution have all but disappeared from the modem scene.3
Nonetheless, there was a time when keeping promises was
something important rather than an occasionally useful device
for acquiring and retaining power.4 As anyone who is familiar
* Professor, Boston University School of Law.
1. The Constitution requires an oath for all legislative, executive, and judicial
officers, both state and federal, but does not prescribe the precise form of the oath.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 ('The Senators and Representatives before mentioned,
and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by
Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution"). The first statute of the first
Congress specified the required oaths. Act of June 1, 1789, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 23
(codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
2. US. CONsr. art. H, § 1, cl. 8.
3. Mike Paulsen has valiantly tried to keep the oath clauses alive. See Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is,
83 GEO. L.J. 217, 257-62 (1994).
4. See The Judds, Grandpa (Tell Me 'Bout the Good Old Days), on SPIRITUAL
REFLECTIONS (MCA Records 1985).
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with the story of a certain faithful elephant can attest, the older
view was right. Keeping your word is good.5 Breaking your
word is bad.6 This is especially true when your word is
formalized through a mechanism, such as an oath, that is
specifically designed to emphasize the promise with "I really
mean it!" Moreover, if a person acquires property by making a
promise that he has no intention of honoring, he commits
fraud-in the eyes of reason and justice if not always in the
eyes of the law. The Constitution requires anyone who takes
the office of the presidency to swear a very specific oath as a
condition of receiving the benefits of that office. Taking those
benefits (including the substantial salary and pension that goes
with the office) while disregarding the oath is fraud by any
plausible understanding of the term.
Thus, my advice to the new President is the same advice that
I would give to any candidate or officeholder, any witness, or
any party to a marriage: Do not take an oath that you are not
prepared to keep. The President therefore must have a very
clear picture of what the presidential oath of office requires.
What does it mean to "preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution"? Against what threats must the Constitution be
preserved, protected, and defended?
Assuming that the President conscientiously follows his oath
and therefore poses no threat himself, there are three principal
threats to the Constitution that the President must address:
Congress, the federal courts, and the States.7 Because the
President has no unilateral power directly to control state
officials, I will discuss only the President's obligations with
respect to Congress and the federal courts. In both cases the
President's constitutional duty is clear.'
5. See DR. SEUSS, HORTON HATCHES THE EGG 16,21,26,38,51-52 (1940).
6. See CARLO COLLODI, THE ADVENTURES OF PINOCCHIO passin (University of
California Press 1986).
7. Of course, the President must also be prepared to deal with foreign invaders,
but it seems odd to characterize this as a threat to the Constitution.
8. My discussion in this article grows out of, and in some respects replicates, a
much longer analysis that I coauthored with Chris Moore five years ago. See Gary
Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996). Needless to say, Mr. Moore bears no
responsibility for the present article.
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I. DEALING WITH CONGRESS
Congress's primary function is to make laws.9  The
Constitution assigns the President four principal
responsibilities in connection with this lawmaking function: He
must recommend to Congress "such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient"; ° he must sign or veto congressional
enactments;" he must employ "[t]he executive Power" 2 to
carry laws into effect; 3 and he must nominate or appoint
officers to aid him in these tasks." The President has other
responsibilities as well, such as the power to convene or
adjourn Congress on occasion 5 and the duty to commission
officers,16 but the initial four are the most important contexts in
which the President faces constitutional issues when dealing
with Congress.
The President's responsibilities under the Recommendation
Clause are clear: recommend to Congress the enactment of
measures that are constitutional, and recommend the repeal of
existing laws that are unconstitutional. That much is beyond
cavil. The only question is how the President is to assess the
constitutionality of proposed and existing laws. To what extent
can or must the President defer to the constitutional views of
others?
It is helpful to consider this question in the context of a
different but related presidential function: the responsibility to
approve or veto congressional enactments. If he is presented
with a bill that he deems unconstitutional, the President has an
obligation, pursuant to his oath, to veto that bill.' Because the
Constitution does not provide for a line-item veto, the
President must veto an entire measure if the measure contains
an unconstitutional provision, no matter how much the
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
10. Id. art. II, § 3.
11. Id. art. I, §7, c. 2-3. The President can, of course, allow a bill to become law
without actually signing it. Id. art. I, §7, cl. 2.
12. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
13. This power is constrained by the constitutional duty to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed." Id. art. II, § 3.
14. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2-3.
15. Id. art. II, § 3.
16. Id.
17. For an excellent discussion of the veto power and its discretionary
character, see Michael B. Rappaport, The President's Veto and the Constitution, 87
NW. U. L. REV. 735,771-76 (1993).
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President may value the bill's constitutionally permissible
portions. The President, however, does not work off a blank
slate. Congress's decision to send the bill to the President for
signature is an implicit assertion that, in Congress's judgment,
the measure is constitutional. In some rare cases, Congress will
have expressly considered and addressed questions of
constitutionality. May or must the President defer to the
constitutional judgment of Congress?
A full answer requires careful consideration of the different
meanings of the term "deference." Deference, in the sense of
giving weight to another's judgment, runs along a continuum.
At one extreme lies complete deference, in which one accepts
someone else's determination as conclusive. At the other
extreme is de novo consideration, in which the views of others
are either ignored or given no significance. 18 In between is a
range of shades, from "respectful consideration" to
"considerable weight" to "near-conclusive presumption."
Different standards of review, which govern decisions when a
legal actor must decide a question that a prior actor has already
addressed, correspond to different points on this range.'
9
Accordingly, in any discussion of deference, one must always
ask, "How much deference do you mean?"
One must also distinguish between three very different
reasons for deferring (in whatever amount) to another actor.
These differently-grounded forms of deference can be called
legal deference, epistemological deference, and economic
deference.
20
Legal deference is deference that is due another actor simply
by virtue of that actor's status, without regard to the reasoning
18. In principle, one could have negative deference, in which the fact that
others hold a view counts (perhaps even conclusively) against that view. Other
than Supreme Court review of Ninth Circuit decisions, it is hard to imagine
circumstances in which negative deference would play a role in the legal system.
19. My goal here is not exhaustively to catalogue and define the law's
standards of review. But one can rank, in terms of degree of deference, at least
some of the major legal standards: de novo, clearly erroneous, clear and
convincing evidence, substantial evidence, rational basis, denial of review. Some
standards, such as the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary or capricious
standard, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994), can reflect different degrees of deference
depending on the context. See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 705
(1998).
20. Chris Moore and I have elsewhere discussed at length the distinction
between legal and epistemological deference. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 8,
at 1271,1278-79,1300-02.
384 [Vol. 24
No. 2] Everything I Need To Know About Presidents 385
or quality of the prior decision. Federal courts must give
enormous deference to the factual findings of juries simply
because those findings come from juries, even if a particular
jury may not have been well suited to its task. Similarly,
conventional doctrine requires courts to give considerable
deference (although perhaps a lesser amount than they owe
juries) to factual findings of administrative agencies or lower
courts simply because of the status of those decisionmakers.2
This holds even if a specific agency or court has a well
deserved reputation for ineptitude; the entity's status controls.
Epistemological deference, by contrast, is based on the
reliability rather than the status of the prior decisionmaker.
One gives epistemological deference when, and to the extent
that, one considers the prior decision to be good evidence of
the right answer. I defer to, for example, Akhil Amar, Steve
Calabresi, and John Harrison on many questions of
constitutional law, not because of anything in their titles,
locations, or gene pools, but because they have examined many
questions more carefully than I have (or ever will), and they are
very smart, and they generally employ a methodology that is
well calculated to yield right answers, and they can be trusted
to apply that methodology honestly, and they have a host of
other attributes that give some assurance of reliability. In fact, it
would often be affirmatively wrong for me not to give them
some measure of deference. If the goal is to answer a question
correctly, it is irrational to refuse to give weight to
considerations that are good evidence of the right answer.
Many times, someone else's prior decision will be precisely
such a relevant consideration. As long as the relevant indicia of
reliability are operative, some measure of deference to these
scholars is appropriate. When, however, those indicia are
absent-for instance, when these scholars apply an incorrect
methodology, such as undue reliance on prior judicial
decisions-the conditions of deference may not be present, or
may be lessened.
21. I have elsewhere argued that Congress lacks the power to impose this
regime of deference on the federal courts, see Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent:
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decisionmaking, 17 CONST. COMMENT.
(forthcoming 2000), but the example will still prove useful to those who do not
share my somewhat idiosyncratic view on this subject. The Constitution requires
federal courts to defer to a jury's factual determinations whether or not Congress
has the power to compel judicial deference. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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Although epistemological deference is ultimately
instrumentalist because it is a device for reaching right
answers, it need not involve all-things-considered
decisionmaking in each application. Indeed, there can be
circumstances in which epistemological deference leads,
effectively, to legal (or status-based) deference. If someone else
is systematically better positioned to resolve a certain class of
questions, it may be epistemologically appropriate simply to
treat them as though they were status-privileged and to give
them deference without any (or any close) examination of
whether particularized conditions for deference exist in any
given case. Rational thinking requires information-managing
rules, and rules can result from epistemological as well as legal
(or status-based) inquiries.
Economic deference surfaces when considerations of cost
counsel against re-examining previously decided questions.
Information is not a free good. Figuring out the right answers
to legal questions takes time, thought, energy, and sometimes
money-all of which can have significant opportunity costs. In
some circumstances, it might not be worthwhile to reconsider
even an unreliable answer provided by someone else. As the
saying goes, having an answer can be more important than
having the right answer. At a minimum, one should always
ask how much the right answer costs. There is always a price
tag on justice.
This jurisprudential detour, believe it or not, bears directly
on the President's constitutional responsibility. When faced
with the decision whether to sign or veto a bill, the President
has an oath-imposed obligation to determine, as best he can,
whether the bill is constitutional. Does the prior (implicit or
explicit) judgment of Congress on the bill's constitutionality
call forth any legal deference on the part of the President?
It certainly does not conclusively resolve questions of
constitutionality as a matter of law. This was precisely the
point made so elegantly by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v.
Madison.22 Marshall correctly reasoned that federal courts, no
less than Congress or the President, have an obligation to
22. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In fact, Marbury involved a situation in which
both Congress and the President had implicitly judged a statute constitutional,
but the analysis does not depend on the number of departments that have
previously addressed a question.
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interpret and apply the Constitution as part of their duty to
decide cases and that the Constitution does not make prior
congressional judgments conclusively binding on the courts.
Precisely the same reasoning applies to the President's
evaluation of a bill that the Congress deems constitutional. The
President is no more bound by Congress's judgments about the
Constitution than are the courts.
That says only, however, that the Constitution does not
mandate an extreme form of legal deference to Congress's
interpretation of the Constitution; it does not rule out some
lesser form of legal deference, such as a presumption (and
possibly a strong one) in favor of enacted statutes or bills.'
Chris Moore and I, however, have elsewhere argued at length
that the best reading of the Constitution imposes no general
rule of legal deference on the federal courts with respect to
constitutional judgments of Congress and the President,24 nor
does it require the President to give legal deference to the
views of Congress.' The President is free to exercise
independent constitutional judgment when faced with
decisions under the Presentment Clauses.
What about epistemological deference? Should the President
give any degree of weight to the constitutional judgment of
Congress because such congressional judgments are good
evidence of the right answer? Although one can perhaps
imagine specific circumstances in which the answer might be
yes, in the general run of cases contemporary congressional
judgments about constitutionality carry almost no indicia of
reliability. Congress does not generally take its interpretative
task seriously, and it certainly does not apply a methodology
(namely, the methodology of original public meaning)
calculated to yield right answers.2 6 It would be starkly
23. The classic defense of such a rule of legal deference to Congress by courts is
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
24. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 8, at 1274-79. There may be particular
obligations of deference stemming from specific constitutional clauses or
circumstances, but there is no general obligation of deference.
25. See id. at 1288-90.
26. I am assuming, of course, that this particular species of originalism is the
correct way to interpret the Constitution. See Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes...
and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823 (1997). This part of my argument does not
depend on such a premise (although much of the rest of my argument does), as it
is highly unlikely that Congress consistently employs whatever methodology the
reader deems appropriate.
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irrational, and a breach of the oath of office, for the President to
treat congressional constitutional judgments as presumptively
worthy of deference. It might be reasonable for the President to
defer to the judgments of trusted advisers, or even wise law
professors, but Congress is an improbable source of wisdom
about constitutional meaning.
Considerations of economic deference require a more
nuanced analysis to reach the same result. As a general
proposition, considerations of cost are not a good excuse for a
President to accept an answer that does not have a sufficient
legal pedigree or sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant,
respectively, legal or epistemological deference. The
President's oath does not state that he will "preserve, protect,
and defend the Constitution whenever it is convenient." But
the President cannot spend all of his waking moments
pondering deep questions of constitutional law. The oath itself
recognizes inevitable human limitations by only imposing a
duty to defend the Constitution "to the best of my Ability,"
which acknowledges that perfection is unattainable, and
probably undesirable given its likely cost. Nonetheless, I do
not see any room for economic deference to the constitutional
judgments of Congress. There are circumstances in which the
President will have no rational choice but to defer to the views
of others, but those others do not have to be Congress. The
President's responsibilities under his oath include the ancillary
responsibility to surround himself with people to whom
epistemological deference is warranted, so that when the
President cannot personally make good decisions about the
Constitution, he can rely on the sound views of others.
What about courts? To what extent should or must the
President consult judicial interpretations of the Constitution in
deciding whether to sign or veto legislation? In deciding, for
example, whether to sign a bill involving the minimum wage,
is it relevant or decisive that courts will certainly uphold the
federal government's power to regulate labor contracts?
Judicial judgments are entitled to no more legal deference in
this context than are congressional judgments. Just as courts
are not bound by presidential decisions when they exercise
their constitutional function of deciding cases, presidents are
not bound by judicial decisions when they exercise their
constitutional function of signing or vetoing legislation. The
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case for a power of presidential (and congressional) review that
is independent of prior judicial decisions is precisely
coterminous with the case for -judicial review that is
independent of prior presidential and congressional
judgments. A President who considers himself legally bound
by the constitutional judgments of courts when exercising the
presentment power violates his oath of office.
Nor are court decisions generally entitled to epistemological
deference. It is possible to imagine a world in which judicial
decisions are presumptive evidence of right answers to
constitutional questions, just as it is possible to imagine a world
in which congressional judgments are presumptive evidence of
right answers. Whether or not that world ever existed-and I
think that "not" has the better of the argument -it is clearly not
the world that we have today. Courts decide constitutional
cases badly.27 Indeed, they generally decide them entirely
without reference to the Constitution.28 Even to call them
"constitutional cases" is merely a polite metaphor. One perhaps
could find rare exceptions in which court decisions might
warrant epistemological deference, but it would take at least as
much work to identify the exceptions as it would simply to
figure out right answers from scratch. For the President to rely
on judicial decisions as good evidence of constitutional
meaning would be a flagrant disregard of the oath of office.
And finally, considerations of economic deference do not
justify deference to court decisions for the same reasons that
they do not justify deference to congressional decisions.
The President thus has a constitutional responsibility to base
decisions to sign or veto legislation on his independent
judgment about the meaning of the Constitution, unmediated
in the general run of cases by analogous congressional or
judicial judgments. The same is true a fortiori of decisions
under the Recommendation Clause.29
In practice, this means that the President has an obligation
27. See any volume selected at random from the Federal Reporter System
passin.
28. See id. passin.
29. In the case of recommendations of new measures, there is no prior
congressional judgment to review (although there may be prior congressional,
presidential, or judicial judgments that are highly analogous). In the case of
recommendations for repeal of existing laws, there are prior judgments to review,
and the analysis tracks precisely the line of reasoning in the presentment context.
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under his oath to veto virtually everything that Congress will
send him and to recommend the repeal of virtually everything
that Congress has already enacted. Almost everything that the
modem federal government does, in both substance and form,
is flagrantly unconstitutional." The fact that Congress, the
courts, prior Presidents, and an overwhelming majority of the
American people all acquiesce in these violations does not
make them go away. The Constitution means what it says, and
it is the Constitution that the President swears to preserve,
protect, and defend.
Thus, the new President's first obligation is to veto pretty
much every bill sent to him and to recommend the repeal of
pretty much everything in the United States Code.
The President next must decide how to handle
unconstitutional laws that Congress enacts over his veto or
refuses to repeal. Consider what courts are supposed to do in
these circumstances. An unconstitutional law is no law at all
and therefore should be given no effect in adjudications. 3' By
precisely the same reasoning, the President should give
unconstitutional laws no effect in executing his responsibilities.
The power of presidential review is the same as the power of
judicial review.32 The President has both the power and the
duty to refuse to enforce laws that he determines (without
either legal or epistemological deference to Congress or the
courts) are unconstitutional.
Thus, the new President's second obligation is to refuse to
enforce most of the United States Code.33
Obviously, the President cannot personally carry out all of
the functions required by the Constitution. Other executive
department personnel must assume most of the day-to-day
responsibility for executing the laws of the United States. The
30. See Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 1231 (1994).
31. Whether such laws are voidable or void depends on theories about party
control of litigation that are far beyond the scope of this Article.
32. Chris Moore and I have elsewhere argued at length that neither the veto
power nor the Take Care Clause weakens the case for independent presidential
review in the context of law execution. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 8, at 1304-
06,1312-13.
33. What about pardoning people who have been convicted under
unconstitutional laws? As Thomas Jefferson taught us, that is a fine idea, and it
may even be a moral duty, but it does not rise to the level of a constitutional duty.
The pardon power is inherently discretionary, even on constitutional matters. See
Rappaport, supra note 17, at 776-79.
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President has two obligations with respect to these
subordinates. First, the President must ensure (to the extent
possible) that his presidential appointees (including both those
who do and do not require Senate confirmation) will maintain
fidelity to the Constitution. Second, to the extent that his
subordinates fail to preserve, protect, and defend the
Constitution, the President must take the steps within his
power to control them, whether by removing them from
office,' 4 overruling their decisions," or both.
Thus, the new President's third obligation is to ensure that
his subordinates do not enforce most of the United States Code.
II. DEALING WITH COURTS
Courts routinely fail to decide cases in accordance with the
Constitution. What can the President do about this? Not very
much.
Congress has the power to impeach and remove judges who
fail in their duty, but the President has no role in that process.
Nor can the President recommend measures to control the
decisionmaking processes of judges; those processes cannot be
regulated by statute.36 There are really only two things that the
President can do. The first is to appoint judges who will get it
right. If that means litmus tests, such as ruling out any
prospective nominee who thinks that the Constitution contains
an inalienable right to suck the brains out of babies, so be it.
Second, the President can refuse to enforce at least some court
judgments that contravene the Constitution. This, however, is
the one context in which the decision of another actor-a
judicial judgment-imposes an obligation of legal deference on
the President. That deference is not absolute, but it does require
the President to enforce judgments unless he is firmly
convinced, with a high degree of confidence, that the judgment
rests on constitutional error. And even in those circumstances,
the President must honor a judgment of no liability. The
President's powers, and therefore oath-imposed duties, with
34. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723-27 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. See Lawson, supra note 30, at 1241-46.
36. At least, I don't think that they can. See Lawson, supra note 21. If I am wrong
about that, then the President may have relevant obligations under the
Recommendation Clause.
37. This is a complicated topic that Chris Moore and I have dealt with at length
elsewhere. See Lawson & Moore, supra note 8, at 1313-29.
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
respect to the judiciary are sharply limited.
III. CONCLUSION
The President's constitutional duty under his oath of office is
far broader and more radical than any modem President will
likely acknowledge, much less execute. Indeed, no President
who took his oath seriously could get elected or stay in office,
nor could most members of Congress.38 That is merely a
reflection, though, of the fact that we long ago stopped being
governed by the Constitution in any meaningful sense. It does
not affect the content or significance of the oath of office. If the
President wants to place expediency, the Gallup polls, or even
a genuine concern for the national interest above his oath, he
should do it openly by simply dispensing with the oath and its
accompanying pretense of constitutional government. He
should not drag the defenseless oath down with him.
38. The only exception that comes to mind is Congressman Ron Paul, who takes
his oath fairly seriously and has nonetheless managed to be elected several times.
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